فلسفه معاصر

فلسفه معاصر

ابهام هستی‌شناختی در استدلال عدم‌ تقارن: نقدی نو بر آنتی‌ناتالیسم بناتار

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری رشته فلسفه و کلام، دانشگاه باقرالعلوم علیه السلام، قم، ایران
2 استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه باقرالعلوم علیه السلام ، قم، ایران
10.22034/jcp.2025.560919.1211
چکیده
آنتی‌ناتالیسم همان‌گونه که در آثار کلاسیک دیوید بناتار و سپس در پژوهش‌های بعدی مطرح شده است، بر این باور است که ایجاد انسان جدید به لحاظ اخلاقی نادرست است؛ زیرا وجود همواره با رنج و ضرر همراه است. این مقاله با هدف بررسی بنیادهای هستی‌شناختی این دیدگاه، استدلال می‌کند که آنتی‌ناتالیسم با خطای مقوله‌ای مواجه است؛ چرا‌که فرض می‌کند موجود بالقوه پیش از وجود بالفعل، دارای هویت معین و مخاطره‌پذیری است. با طرح مفهوم «ابهام هستی‌شناختی» نشان داده می‌شود که سوژۀ بالقوه فاقد حیات و هویت معین است؛ در‌نتیجه نمی‌تواند موضوع آسیب یا منفعت قرار گیرد. از این رهگذر پارادوکسی پدید می‌آید که می‌توان آن را «پارادوکس اخلاق آینده‌نگر» نامید؛ وضعیتی که در آن نظام اخلاقی می‌کوشد اخلاق را بر اساس پیش‌بینی رنج‌های احتمالیِ موجوداتی بنا نهد که هنوز متحقق نشده‌اند. این وضعیت مردود است؛ زیرا به حذف ارزش ذاتی وجود می‌انجامد و هستی را صرفاً به حسابگری لذت و رنج فرو می‌کاهد. مقاله در پایان نتیجه می‌گیرد که هر نظریۀ اخلاقی مرتبط با فرزندآوری باید اصل عدم قطعیتِ هستی و ارزش ذاتیِ بودن را لحاظ کند تا از ورطۀ نیهیلیسم وجودی رهایی یابد.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

Ontological Ambiguity in the Asymmetry Argument: A Novel Critique of Benatar's Antinatalism

نویسندگان English

Sakineh Bashi 1
Fatemeh Rajabi 2
1 PhD Candidate in Philosophy and Theology, Baqir al-Olum University, Qom, Iran
2 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Baqir al-Olum University, Qom, Iran
چکیده English

Antinatalism, as presented in David Benatar's classic works and subsequent research, posits that creating new human beings is morally wrong because existence is always accompanied by suffering and harm. This article, aiming to examine the ontological foundations of this view, argues that antinatalism commits a category error by assuming that a potential being possesses a determinate identity and susceptibility to harm prior to actual existence. By introducing the concept of "ontological ambiguity", it is demonstrated that the potential subject lacks life and a determinate identity; consequently, it cannot be the subject of harm or benefit. This leads to a paradox that can be termed the "paradox of future-oriented ethics"—a situation in which an ethical system attempts to base morality on the prediction of potential sufferings of entities that have not yet come into being. This stance is untenable because it results in the negation of the intrinsic value of existence and reduces being merely to a calculus of pleasure and pain. The article concludes that any ethical theory concerning procreation must account for the principle of existential uncertainty and the intrinsic value of being to avoid the abyss of existential nihilism.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Antinatalism
Ontology
Potential Identity
Intrinsic Value of Existence
Future-Oriented Ethics
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