نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسنده English
The problem of free will and moral agency has entered a new phase with the emergence of neuroscience. In his classic experiments, Benjamin Libet demonstrated that brain activity, in the form of the “readiness potential,” begins approximately 350 milliseconds before conscious decision-making, a finding that challenged the traditional conception of conscious initiation. However, by introducing the concept of “veto,” he sought to preserve a role for conscious will in controlling and stopping actions. Mark Johnson, by contrast, drawing on cognitive science and embodied philosophy, developed a naturalistic theory of ethics in which moral judgments are rooted in unconscious, affective, and intuitive processes, and redefined human agency through “moral imagination,” understood as the capacity for reflection, simulation of consequences, and discovery of alternative options. Using a descriptive-analytical method, this article analyzes the intersection of these two perspectives along four dimensions: the redefinition of agency from initiation to control, the role of the unconscious in cognition, the relationship between veto and moral imagination, and the possibility of moral responsibility. The central argument of the article is that moral agency can be redefined as a “multilayered process” in which conscious will is the controlling and ultimately responsible element of action, rather than its initiator. This redefinition preserves moral responsibility while distancing itself from both absolute determinism and excessive voluntarism.
کلیدواژهها English
