In the Western intellectual tradition, René Descartes and Edmund Husserl are two prominent philosophers who sought to establish philosophy through a comparable approach. Descartes’s methodical doubt and Husserl’s epoché represent two fundamental starting points for the foundation of philosophy. Descartes’s methodical doubt constitutes his initial step toward discovering the “I”, whereas Husserl’s epoché serves as a pathway to attaining the “transcendental ego.” Despite their apparent similarities, these two procedures and their ultimate outcomes exhibit fundamental divergences. Descartes’s methodical doubt is an instrument for achieving absolute certainty; by doubting all beliefs, he aims to construct an unshakable foundation for knowledge. In contrast, Husserl’s epoché is a “suspension” or “bracketing” designed to access the transcendental subject and the domain of phenomenological inquiry. Employing a descriptive-analytical method based on library sources, this study presents a rigorous reading of Cartesian methodical doubt, followed by an examination of Husserl’s epoché, his reception of Descartes, and his critiques of Cartesian doubt. The final section critically evaluates both of Husserl’s critiques with reference to Descartes’s broader corpus. The primary finding reveals that both Cartesian doubt and Husserlian epoché function as avenues to reach the “I” or “ego.” While commending Descartes’s approach, Husserl advances two principal critiques: first, Descartes’s reliance on the mathematical method, which ceases to remain indubitable once doubt is generalized across all sciences; second, the apprehension of the “I” as a natural entity within the world rather than as a transcendental ego. A thorough re-examination of Descartes’s works demonstrates that doubt is not his ultimate method, but rather a preliminary measure to purge prejudices—one that collapses without rational criteria and analytical methods; similarly, the epoché is not entirely presuppositionless. Furthermore, the cogito fundamentally defines the “I” through modes of consciousness rather than through the body, space, or time.