The analysis of "philosophical concepts" holds significance from multiple perspectives. Philosophers regard these concepts as keys to cognition and solutions for uncovering reality. Most of these concepts take the form of "ambiguous predicative propositions" (qadīyya hamliyya mutaraddid al-maḥmūl) and constitute the core issues of philosophy. An ontological explanation of philosophical concepts addresses the question: Where do these concepts originate? Can they be considered real entities in the world of existence?  In this regard, two major theories exist: First: The theory of "Addition and Objectivity" (ziyāda wa ‘ayniyya), which posits that philosophical concepts are superadded to objects and possess objective reality. Second: The theory of "Addition and Subjectivity" (ziyāda wa dhihniyya), which considers philosophical concepts as superadded to objects but entirely mental constructs. Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (b 549 AH/1154 CE) interprets philosophical concepts as "conventional" (i‘tibārī) in the sense of being purely mental and analyzes them according to the "Addition and Subjectivity" theory. Using a descriptive-analytical method, this paper seeks to answer key questions regarding the ontological analysis of philosophical concepts while comparing Suhrawardī’s perspective with those of his predecessors.  Ultimately, the study concludes that Suhrawardī’s ontological explanation — framed within a discourse where "conventionality" (i‘tibāriyyat) is understood as "mentality" (dhihniyyat) — does not contradict the theory of "Principality of Existence" (aṣālat al-wujūd).