فلسفه معاصر

فلسفه معاصر

تبیین شناختیِ باورهای دینی: چارچوبی سه‌سطحی مبتنی بر علوم شناختیِ دین

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه دین، دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران، قم، ایران
2 دانشیار گروه فلسفه دین، ادیان و عرفان، دانشکده الاهیات، دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران، قم، ایران
10.22034/jcp.2025.513565.1137
چکیده
در این مقاله ضمن ارائه ساختاری نو با رویکرد میان‌رشته‌ای شناختی، باورهای دینی را به سه سطح کلی باورهای شهودی، باورهای شهودی-الاهیاتی و باورهای الاهیاتی تقسیم و برای تبیین هر کدام از روش‌های مختلف در علوم شناختی استفاده کرده‌ایم. سطح اول شامل سه باور اصلی شهودی یعنی باور به موجود فراطبیعی، باور به غایت‌انگاری و باور به دوگانگی نفس و بدن است. سطح دوم بر روی بسط و توسعه باورهای شهودی سوار می‌شوند و شامل باور به خدای شخص‌وار، باور به خدای عالم مطلق و قادر مطلق و خلقت‌باوری یا باور به جهان پس از مرگ می‌شود. این سطح اگرچه به فرهنگ و زمینه وابسته است، زمینه شهودی نیز دارد. سطح سوم اما باورهای کلامی و تاریخی خاص ادیان مثل باور به تثلیث، توحید در ادیان ابراهیمی، باور به معاد یا تناسخ و مانند آن را در‌بر می‌گیرد که از محیط و زمینه اجتماعی ناشی می‌شود و با استفاده از شناخت اجتماعی تبیین‌شدنی هستند. این نوشتار با ارائه چارچوبی سه‌سطحی مبتنی بر علوم شناختی دین (CSR)، به ‌طور روشمند می‌تواند تبیینی برای پیدایش، تکامل و نهادینه‌شدن باورهای دینی در سطوح مختلف ارائه دهد.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

A Cognitive Explanation of Religious Beliefs: A Three-Level Framework Based on the Cognitive Science of Religion

نویسندگان English

Meisam Fasihi Ramandi 1
Mansour Nasiri 2
1 Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy of Religion, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Religions, and Mysticism, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
چکیده English

In this article, while proposing a novel interdisciplinary framework with a cognitive approach, we classify religious beliefs into three general levels: 1) intuitive beliefs, 2) intuitive-theological beliefs, and 3) theological beliefs, employing diverse methods from cognitive sciences to explain each. The first level comprises three core intuitive beliefs: belief in a supernatural agent, belief in teleology, and belief in mind-body dualism. The second level builds upon and extends intuitive beliefs, encompassing belief in a personal God, belief in an omniscient and omnipotent God, and creationism (or belief in an afterlife). Although this level is culturally and contextually dependent, it also has an intuitive foundation. The third level, however, includes specific doctrinal and historical beliefs of religions—such as belief in the Trinity, monotheism in Abrahamic religions, and belief in resurrection, reincarnation, or similar concepts—which arise from social and environmental contexts and can be explained through social cognition. By presenting a three-level framework grounded in the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR), this study offers a systematic explanation for the emergence, evolution, and institutionalization of religious beliefs across different levels. 

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Cognitive Sciences of religion (CSR)
three-level theory of belief
intuitive beliefs
intuitive-theological beliefs
theological beliefs

1 کتاب‌نامه

بیابانکی، س. م. (1398 هـ.ش). «سوگیری‌های شناختی ذهن انسان در پذیرش باورهای دینی». پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت). دوره 17. ش 2. ص 201 – 224.
پورمحمدی، نعیمه؛ و میثم فصیحی رامندی. (1400 هـ.ش). «گشایش معمای ایدۀ "خداباوری شهودی" و وجود پرشمار خداناباوران: پژوهشی در علوم شناختی دین». پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت). دوره 19. ش 1. ص 207 – 226.
Atran, S., & Henrich, J. (2010). The Evolution of Religion: How Cognitive By-Products, Adaptive Learning Heuristics, Ritual Displays, and Group Competition Generate Deep Commitments to Prosocial Religions. Biological Theory, 5(1), 18–30. https://doi.org/10.1162/BIOT_a_00018
Barrett, J. L. (1998). Cognitive Constraints on Hindu Concepts of the Divine. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 37(4), 608–619. https://doi.org/10.2307/1388144
Barrett, J. L. (2000). Exploring the natural foundations of religion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(1), 29–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01419-9
Barrett, J. L. (2004). Why Would Anyone Believe in God? AltaMira Press.
Barrett, J. L. (2011). Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology: From Human Minds to Divine Minds (First Edition, 1). Templeton Press.
Barrett, J. L., & Richert, R. A. (2003). Anthropomorphism or Preparedness? Exploring Children’s God Concepts. Review of Religious Research, 44(3), 300–312. https://doi.org/10.2307/3512389
Bering, J. (2012a). The Belief Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny, and the Meaning of Life (Reprint edition). W. W. Norton & Company.
Bering, J. (with Internet Archive). (2012b). The belief instinct: The psychology of souls, destiny, and the meaning of life. New York : W.W. Norton. http://archive.org/details/beliefinstinctps0000beri
Bering, J. M. (2002). Intuitive Conceptions of Dead Agents’ Minds: The Natural Foundations of Afterlife Beliefs as Phenomenological Boundary. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2(4), 263–308. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685370260441008
Bering, J. M. (2006). The folk psychology of souls. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29(5), 453–462; discussion 462-498. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X06009101
Biabanaki, S. M. (2020). The cognitive biases of human mind in accepting and transmitting religious and theological beliefs: An analysis based on the cognitive science of religion. HTS Theological Studies, 76(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v76i1.5799
Bloom, P. (2007). Religion is natural. Developmental Science, 10(1), 147–151. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00577.x
Boyer, P. (1994a). Cognitive constraints on cultural representations: Natural ontologies and religious ideas. In Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 391–411). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511752902.016
Boyer, P. (1994b). The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion (First Edition). University of California Press.
Boyer, P. (2000). Functional Origins of Religious Concepts: Ontological and Strategic Selection in Evolved Minds. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 6(2), 195–214.
Boyer, P. (2004). Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought (Nachdr.). Basic Books.
Clark, K. J. (2019). God and the brain: The rationality of belief. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
De Cruz, H., & De Smedt, J. (2017). How Psychological Dispositions Influence the Theology of the Afterlife (Y. Nagasawa & B. Matheson, Eds.; pp. 435–453). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-48609-7_22
Durkheim, E. (2008). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (M. S. Cladis, Ed.; C. Cosman, Trans.; Abridged edition). Oxford University Press.
Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman, M. D., & Williams, K. D. (2003). Does rejection hurt? An FMRI study of social exclusion. Science (New York, N.Y.), 302(5643), 290–292. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1089134
Feuerbach, L. (2013). Religion as Projection. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Religion-as-Projection-Feuerbach/0d0b98ff1f47a35d34bb1ac6564f0010c5f78f54
Gervais, W. M., McKay, R. T., Brown-Iannuzzi, J. L., Ross, R. M., Pennycook, G., Jong, J., & Lanman, J. A. (2025). Belief in belief: Even atheists in secular countries show intuitive preferences favoring religious belief. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1986). The Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror Management Theory. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), Public Self and Private Self (pp. 189–212). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-9564-5_10
Henrich, J. (2009). The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion: Credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural evolution. Evolution and Human Behavior, 30(4), 244–260. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.03.005
Hume, D. (2016). The Natural History of Religion. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
Järnefelt, E., Canfield, C. F., & Kelemen, D. (2015). The divided mind of a disbeliever: Intuitive beliefs about nature as purposefully created among different groups of non-religious adults. Cognition, 140, 72–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.02.005
Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and reason (pp. xxxviii, 233). University of Chicago Press.
Kelemen, D. (1999). Why are rocks pointy? Children’s preference for teleological explanations of the natural world. Developmental Psychology, 35(6), 1440–1452. https://doi.org/10.1037//0012-1649.35.6.1440
Kelemen, D., & Rosset, E. (2009). The Human Function Compunction: Teleological explanation in adults. Cognition, 111(1), 138–143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.01.001
Kelemen, D., Rottman, J., & Seston, R. (2013). Professional physical scientists display tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose-based reasoning as a cognitive default. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 142(4), 1074–1083. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030399
Knight, N., Sousa, P., Barrett, J. L., & Atran, S. (2004). Children’s attributions of beliefs to humans and God: Cross-cultural evidence. Cognitive Science, 28(1), 117–126. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsci.2003.09.002
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought. Basic Books.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (2003). Metaphors We Live By (First Edition). University of Chicago Press.
Lane, J. D., Wellman, H. M., & Evans, E. M. (2014). Approaching an understanding of omniscience from the preschool years to early adulthood. Developmental Psychology, 50(10), 2380–2392. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037715
Lieberman, M. D. (2007). Social cognitive neuroscience: A review of core processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 259–289. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085654
Lieberman, M. D. (2013). Social: Why Our Brains Are Wired to Connect (First Edition). Crown.
McCauley, R. N. (2013). Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not (1st edition). Oxford University Press.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (2021). Anthropomorphism and Epistemic Anthropo-philautia: The Early Critiques by Xenophanes and Heraclitus. In B. M. Sattler & U. Coope (Eds.), Ancient Ethics and the Natural World (pp. 71–89). Cambridge University Press; Cambridge Core. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108885133.005
Norenzayan, A. (2013). Big gods: How religion transformed cooperation and conflict (pp. xiii, 248). Princeton University Press.
Piaget, J. (1929). The Child’s Conception of the World (Reprint edition). Littlefield, Adams & Co.
Pyysiäinen, I. (2001). How Religion Works: Towards a New Cognitive Science of Religion (Illustrated edition). Brill.
Schjoedt, U. (2009). The Religious Brain: A General Introduction to the Experimental Neuroscience of Religion. Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, 21(3), 310–339. https://doi.org/10.1163/157006809X460347
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (First Edition). Cambridge University Press.
Sperber, D. (1997). Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs. Mind & Language, 12(1), 67–83. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00062.x
Susanto, S., & Idris, S. (2017). RELIGION: SIGMUND FREUD’S INFANTILE ILLUSIONS AND COLLECTIVE NEUROSIS PERSPECTIVE. Ar-Raniry, International Journal of Islamic Studies, 4, 55. https://doi.org/10.20859/jar.v4i1.125