In his major works (A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding), David Hume reduces the mind to a bundle of perceptions—impressions and ideas—and eliminates consciousness as an independent category or substance. Nevertheless, while denying consciousness, he still regards self-consciousness as an experiential phenomenon arising from perceptions and mental processes such as memory and imagination, without, however, grounding these experiences in an account of consciousness itself. This article argues that neglecting consciousness constitutes a fundamental error in Hume’s philosophy, rendering his system inconsistent and incomplete across ontological, epistemological, psychological, and methodological dimensions. By engaging Hume’s primary texts and presenting four critical arguments—(1) the meaninglessness of experience without consciousness, (2) the paradox of self-consciousness without a conscious ground, (3) the excesses of anti-metaphysical reductionism and its weakening of experience, and (4) the inability to sustain psychological coherence—this study demonstrates that the elimination of consciousness undermines the possibility of explaining key categories such as subjective experience and personal identity, thereby jeopardizing the internal coherence of Hume’s system. On this basis, and in light of the centrality of consciousness within philosophy, the paper seeks to expose the fundamental weaknesses of Hume’s empiricist framework on this issue.