Self-refutation challenges epistemological theories in contemporary philosophy by testing any theory that offers a universal criterion for meaning, knowledge, or justification against itself. Using an analytical-descriptive method, this study examines the relationship between ordinary life and self-refutation within logical positivism and the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. It shows that Carnap, Reichenbach, Ayer, and Hempel—by appealing to ordinary language use and distinguishing linguistic rules from empirical statements—try to protect the verification principle from self-refutation. However, these solutions still imply a metalanguage stance and are criticized by Quine and Putnam. In contrast, the later Wittgenstein, in his language-game theory, links meaning to use and forms of life, thereby questioning any universal, metalanguage criteria for knowledge. This research argues that Wittgenstein’s significance lies not merely in answering self-refutation, but in dissolving the very conditions that generate this problem within traditional views of language and knowledge. Accordingly, the article shows that the ordinary flow of life serves two different—even conflicting—philosophical functions within these two approaches.