"Mark Johnson’s naturalistic ethics, drawing on findings from the cognitive sciences, posits morality as a construct derived from human embodied, emotional, and social experiences, rejecting any formal foundations independent of the lifeworld. Conversely, W.D. Ross’s intuitionistic deontology emphasizes the independent normative validity of ethical principles; yet, when applied to variable situations, it encounters the problem of 'indeterminacy' in determining the relative weights of duties. Through a comparative analysis of these two perspectives, this paper argues that by utilizing Richardson’s approach to objectifying the weight of duties—via attention to the specific function of each duty and the objective realities of the situation—this difficulty in Rossian ethics can be overcome. Consequently, it is argued that the problem-solving model within Johnson’s thought provides the necessary ethical content for judgment, while Ross’s intuitive reason establishes the normative form of obligation. In this integrated model, Johnson’s embodied experience and Ross’s rational intuition are brought into an organic synthesis of content and form, which is operationalized for practical application through a three-stage procedural mechanism for determining the objective weight of duties."