quantum mechanics, along with an analysis of the theological implications of these two approaches. The main question is whether the structural similarity between Hume’s denial of causal necessity and the rejection of determinism in quantum physics is merely formal or has an epistemological foundation, and whether the use of this similarity by New Atheism movements to critique theological arguments is justified. The research methodology is critical and comparative analysis, which, through documentary examination of philosophical sources and philosophy of science texts, first analyzes each approach independently, then compares their similarities and differences. The findings indicate that both approaches align on the criterion of empirical observability—a connection that has continued through logical positivism. Furthermore, Hume’s approach faces internal tensions, and New Atheist arguments suffer from conflation of levels of causality and unwarranted generalization of quantum laws. The conclusion is that these critiques pertain to predictive determinism, not a negation of the principle of metaphysical causality.